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The Setting
Situation:
● A system is scanned for vulnerable services
● Remote and local exploits are used to break in
● The system is compromised and the attacker gained 
the access privileges of the administrator
What does the attacker want?
● Reconnect without having to use the exploit again
● Stay unnoticed as long as possible
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Definition
A Rootkit enables an attacker to stay unnoticed on a 
compromised system so he can use it for his purposes.
Traditional rootkit 'features':
● Hide files, processes and network connections
● Filter logfiles
● Provide a hidden backdoor into the system
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Timeline
● Hiding out under UNIX, Black Tie Affair,
Phrack 25, 1989
● System Binaries are exchanged on SunOS 4 
systems (Trojan Horses)
● Linux Rootkits appear
● Abuse of the Linux Kernel for Fun and Profit, 
Halflife, Phrack 50, 1997
● Kernel Rootkits appear for all popular UNIX 
versions and Microsoft Windows
1990
2000
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Classification
            Classification of kernel rootkits
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Classification
Different criteria of a rootkit can be used for classification.
Example: How is the flow of execution intercepted?
● The flow of execution needs to be intercepted or 
modified at some point
● The manipulation can take place at many different 
levels in user or kernel space. This determines:
● What features the rootkit can provide
● How the rootkit can be detected
Where does a rootkit intercept 'ls' to hide files?
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Intercepting the flow of execution
The flow of execution
● Process 'ls' uses 
library, which makes 
system call
● The system changes 
into kernel mode and 
calls function in kernel
● Every user process
is affected when the 
kernel is manipulated
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Inside the kernel
 
Executing a syscall in 
the kernel:
● Interrupt handler 
consults the IDT
● System call handler 
consults Syscall Table
● Function implementing 
the system call is 
executing other kernel 
functions
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Inside the kernel
 
Manipulating the
Syscall Table:
● The rootkit is called 
instead of original 
function
● Rootkit acts as a 
wrapper
● Method used by first 
kernel rootkits
Examples:
Adore, KIS, ...
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Inside the kernel
 
Copying the syscall 
table / handler:
● Original syscall table
is not modified
● Modified syscall 
handler uses 
manipulated copy
Examples:
SucKIT
Andreas Bunten - © 2004 DFN-CERT Services GmbH    12   
Inside the kernel
 
Manipulating the IDT: 
● A different syscall 
handler is used, which
calls rootkit
● No need to modify 
syscall handler or
syscall table
Examples:
Concept rootkits
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Inside the kernel
 
Manipulation deeper 
inside the kernel:
● Less central kernel 
structures are 
manipulated
● Hard to detect since 
many kernel structures 
need to be monitored
Examples:
Adore-NG manipulates
/proc using virtual 
filesystem (VFS)
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Classification
Intercepting the flow of execution:
● User space:
● Exchange system binaries
● Infect library
● Manipulation in kernel space:
● Interrupt Descriptor Table
● Syscall Handler
● Syscall Table
● VFS layer
● ...
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Classification
Further criteria useable for classification:
● How is a backdoor provided?
● How is the rootkit loaded at restart of the system?
● What features are provided?
● E.g. automatic log filtering of hidden processes (KIS)
● How is code transferred into the kernel?
● Official API for kernel modules (Adore, knark, ...)
● Raw memory device (e.g. /dev/kmem or kernel exploit)
(SucKIT)
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Classification
Classification of example rootkits:
                                Adore 0.34  SucKIT 1.3b  Adore-NG 1.31
Intercepting the    syscall syscall VFS
flow of execution    table handler
 
Code transfer    module raw memory module
into the kernel access
 
Remote backdoor    - yes -
included
 
Reload mechanism    - /sbin/init tool to infect 
existing modules
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Countermeasures
Countermeasuers for
current kernel rootkits
Andreas Bunten - © 2004 DFN-CERT Services GmbH    18   
Countermeasures
Typical methods to detect a rootkit:
● Checksums of important files (aide, tripwire, ...)
● Rootkit detector programs using signatures
(chkrootkit, rootkit hunter, ...)
● Backups of central kernel structures (kstat)
● Runtime measurement of system calls (patchfinder)
● Anti-rootkit kernel modules (St Michael)
● Offline / forensic analysis (TCT, ...)
● Watching the network traffic / flows from 3rd system
● Manual logfile analysis and search
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Countermeasures
Applying runtime detection methods:
                                Adore 0.34  SucKIT 1.3b  Adore-NG 1.31
Checksums
aide 0.7
Process list
chkproc
Kernel structures
kstat 2.4
Rootkit detector
chkrootkit 0.43
Runtime
measurements ...
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Examples
Rootkits seen by 
DFN-CERT
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Examples
Rootkits seen in real incidents:
● Plattforms: mostly Linux, MS Windows and Solaris;
occasionally BSD, Tru64, HP-UX, AIX, ...
● Attackers using different misconfigured rootkits 
together on one system
● Attackers combining sophisticated methods:
● multistage attacks
● obfuscated rootkits
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Examples
Example incident with obfuscated rootkit:
● Rootkit was installed on SSH gateway of research site
● Logins were sniffed / ~ 30 research sites involved
● Rootkit SucKIT was combined with burneye tool
● Rootkit loader (/sbin/init) was obfuscated (no encryption)
● Output of 'strings' was empty
● Obfuscation could be reversed with free tools
● As soon as rootkit was known:
● Remote scanner for this version of SucKIT can be used
● Local detection became very easy
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Examples
linux:/sbin # ls -al init*
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root  392124  Jan 6 2003 init
linux:/sbin # mv init initX
linux:/sbin # ls -al init*
-rwxr-xr-x  1 root root   28984  Jan 6 2003 initX
linux:/sbin # ./initX
/dev/null
Detected version: 1.3b
use:
./init.bak <uivfp> [args]
u       - uninstall
i       - make pid invisible
v       - make pid visible
f [0/1] - toggle file hiding
p [0/1] - toggle pid hiding
linux:/sbin #
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Conclusions
● Many criteria can be used for the classification of 
rootkits - e.g. the interception of the flow of execution
● Most detection tools are based on specific features of 
rootkits; few use general mechanisms for detection
● Experience shows that identifying the type of rootkit 
helps dealing with the incident
● Tools for generic detection of malware are needed
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Questions?
                                 ???
       Feedback / rootkits: bunten@dfn-cert.de
